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A L I SON CATHCART
The Forgotten ’45: Donald Dubh’s
Rebellion in an Archipelagic Context
ABSTRACT
The final rebellion of Donald Dubh, heir to the forfeited MacDonald
lordship of the Isles, is usually examined within the context of Highland
rebellions that occurred in the half century after forfeiture. The factors
that motivated the Islesmen to rise in rebellion in 1545 were, however,
multi-faceted and can only be fully understood by placing the rising in
a wider context, which considers national and archipelagic events. The
discussion that follows explores the reasons why the Islesmen, almost
unanimously, entered into agreement with Henry VIII to attack Scotland
from the west and why this endeavour failed. At the same time, the article
highlights Henry’s recognition of the strategic importance of the west
which led him into alliance with Donald Dubh and his supporters.
Both the MacDonald lordship of the Isles and Clan Donald have been
the subject of much attention, ranging from populist and romanticised
history to scholarly analysis. Historical research has explored various
aspects of the lordship and illuminated the role of Clan Donald within
both Highland and wider Scottish society during the Middle Ages and
early modern period. Dealt a crippling blow by James III’s forfeiture of
the earldom of Ross in 1475, the lordship of the Isles was forfeited too
in 1493. In the ensuing decades of social and economic dislocation,
the MacDonalds were further weakened by internal division.1 These
problems found expression during the first half of the sixteenth century
in various rebellions that broke out in the western Highlands and Isles,
all of which were instigated by, led by, or connected to branches of
Clan Donald. The last rebellion occurred in 1545, a few years after
James V had annexed the lordship to the crown during his expedition
to the Isles in 1540.2 This rising was led by Donald Dubh, grandson
1 Alison Cathcart, ‘A spent force? The Clan Donald in the aftermath of 1493’, in
R.D. Oram, The Lordship of the Isles (Leiden, forthcoming). Some of the arguments
advanced in this article have been revised and elaborated in the current article.
2 J.M.Thomson et al. (eds), Registrum Mangi Sigilli Regum Scotorum, 11 vols (Edinburgh,
1912-) [RMS], iii, no. 2233; T. Thomson and C. Innes (eds), Acts of the Parliament
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of John MacDonald, fourth lord of the Isles, who had been forfeited
in 1493. Apart from a brief spell in the opening years of the sixteenth
century, when he was involved in a rebellion alongside his uncle, Torquil
MacLeod of Lewis, Donald spent most of his life in captivity.3 His
release, shortly after James V’s death, coincided with several other
events which precipitated the rebellion of 1545.
Most discussions of these early sixteenth-century rebellions suggest
that they aimed at lordship restoration. But the rebellions were
complicated events in which several motives coalesced, none more so
than in 1545. On the part of Donald Dubh, self-interest was paramount.
He stood to regain the lands and lordship held by his grandfather,
John, lord of the Isles. He also was offered English gold and military
support to take revenge on the Gordons of Huntly and the Campbells
of Argyll – two of the leading magnate families in Scotland –who had
responsibility for law and order in the Highlands. The motives of other
chiefs within the former lordship are, however, less certain. They stood
to lose legal title to former lordship lands which they had received after
1493. James IV’s grants and re-grants of land following the forfeiture
had in some cases heightend rivalries within the former lordship. By
1545 some of these tensions still lingered, such as the dispute between
the MacDonalds andMacLeods over Trotternish, in Skye, but in general
it is doubtful that land disputes prompted rebellion.4 But did other
chiefs, like Donald Dubh, also hope to restore the lordship?
Aside from the issue of the lordship, discussion of the rebellions has
generally focused on their wider Scottish context. The cycle of rebellion
and forfeiture fits into a wider historiographical narrative concerning
the efforts of successive Stuart monarchs, from the late fifteenth to the
early seventeenth centuries, to deal with their lawless and disorderly
subjects in the Highlands and Islands. Moreover, successive Stewart
monarchs had sought to maximise royal revenue from rents and
taxes imposed on a region regarded as profitable.5 Just as financial
considerations had been a significant factor in James III’s forfeiture of
the earldom of Ross in 1475, so too finance was a major concern of the
1540 Act of Annexation, which stated that:
2 (Continued) of Scotland, 12 vols (Edinburgh, 1814–75), ii, 360–1, 404–5; K.M. Brown
et al. (eds), Records of the Parliament of Scotland to 1707 (St Andrews, 2007–9),
www.rps.ac.uk [RPS], 1540/12/26 (accessed 30 June 2012). The Act of Annexation
extended to the ‘landis and lordschipis of all his [the king’s] Ilis, south and north; the
tua Kintyris, with the castellis partening tharto and thare pertinentis; the landis and
lordschip of Orknay and Yetland and the ilis pertening thereto and thare pertinentis’.
3 Torquil MacLeod of Lewis was married to Catherine, daughter of Colin Campbell,
first earl of Argyll. See Stephen Boardman, The Campbells, 1250–1513 (Edinburgh,
2006), 283, 283 n. 114.
4 Following the 1493 forfeiture, individual chiefs received charter for their lands from
James IV. Subsequent revocations and re-grants fomented disputes between the
former lordship clans. For details regarding Trotternish, see Donald Gregory, History
of the Western Highlands and Isles of Scotland (Edinburgh, 1836), 130–1.
5 Donald Munro’s A Description of the Occidental i.e. Western Islands of Scotland (1549)
remarked extensively on the rich, fertile land and good hunting and fishing.
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because the patrimonie of his croune and revenois therof being augmentit
is the grett weill and proffitt baith to the kingis grace and all his
liegis . . . therfor it is thocht expedient that oure said sovirane lord . . . suld
annex to his crone for the honorabill support of his estate riale in all
aventouris and caises, baith in weir and paice, sic landis and lordschipis
as ar now presentlie in his handis that ar nocht annext of befor . . . 6
In the wake of James V’s expedition to the Isles in 1540 an extensive
survey was conducted of the land rentals newly acquired by the crown.
This led to an increase in crown revenue. In 1542 John Mackenzie of
Kintail raised practically double the sum of the previous return for
Trotternish.7 Other areas, such as Jura, Colonsay and Ardnamurchan,
returned an account for the first time.8 While the crown ostensibly
intended to set lands ‘to the auld possessouris, quhairbe it is easier
to knaw the auld kyndlie tenentis’, thereby suggesting that traditional
patterns of land-ownership were retained, some chiefs were no doubt
resentful of their new financial burdens.9 Royal intervention took other
forms too. For example, the castle of Dunivaig, held for a long time
by the MacDonalds of Dunivaig, was passed to Archibald Stewart, son
of Ninian Stewart, chamberlain of Bute.10 Royal interference, in its
disparate forms, presumably caused considerable discontent and these
local grievances were inextricably intertwined with the rebellions.
The 1545 rebellion is, however, too often regarded as simply a local
event focused around Donald Dubh. There is a wider context which
must be examined too.11 The Islesmen entered into negotiations with
Henry VIII and, under the leadership of Matthew Stewart, earl of
Lennox, agreed to provide a force that would open another front in
Henry’s war against Scotland, attacking the estates of the Campbells
and Gordons from the west.12 Ten or twelve ships were sent to Scotland
6 RPS, 10 December 1540, 1540/12/26 (accessed 30 June 2012).
7 John Stuart et al., The Exchequer Rolls of Scotland, 23 vols (Edinburgh, 1878–1908)
[ER], xvi, 214, 283, 327; xvii, 18, 79, 218–19, 492–3; Jamie Cameron, James V: The
Personal Rule, 1528–1542 (East Linton, 1998), 240. The annual rental of Trotternish
from 1530 to 1539 was £53 6s 7d but £400 was returned for 1540–2.
8 ER, xvii, 539–41, 545–50, 556–7.
9 ER, xvii, 611–50, at 650.
10 ER, xvii, 278–9.
11 Gordon Donaldson, Scotland: James V–James VII (Edinburgh, 1971), 72. More recent
scholarship pays little attention to the event. See Steve Murdoch, Terror of the Seas?
Scottish Maritime Warfare, 1513–1713 (Leiden, 2010), 49–50, 55; Marcus Merriman,
The Rough Wooings: Mary Queen of Scots, 1542–1551 (East Linton, 2000), 150–1.
12 J.S. Brewer et al. (eds), Letters and Papers, Foreign and Domestic, of the Reign of Henry
VIII, 22 vols (London, 1864–1932) [L&P Henry VIII], xx (II), no. 42; Gregory,Western
Highlands, 170, n. 2; K.A. Steer and J.W.M. Bannerman, Late Medieval Monumental
Sculpture in the West Highlands (Edinburgh, 1997), 212–13. The Islesmen who signed
the agreement with Henry included Hector MacLean of Duart, John Moidertach,
captain of Clanranald, Rory MacLeod of Lewis, Alexander MacLeod of Dunvegan,
Murdoch MacLean of Lochbuie, Angus MacDonald, brother of James MacDonald
of Dunivaig, Allan MacLean of Torloisk, Archibald MacDonald, captain of the
MacDonalds of Sleat, Alexander MacIan of Ardnamurchan, John MacLean of Coll,
‘Gilliganau’ MacNeill of Barra, Ewen MacKinnon of Strathordill, John MacQuarrie
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with the earls of Lennox and Ormond, along with the force of about
2,000 men from Ireland, plus an additional 300 mariners to man the
ships. Donald Dubh had promised a force of 8,000 men and a fleet
of 180 galleys (according to the council of Ireland). Thus, the total
force could be estimated at around 10,000 men and 200 vessels. By
comparison, in 1745 Charles Edward Stuart, the descendant of the
Stuart royal line, arrived in Scotland with the support of Irish Jacobites
but only two vessels, from France, one of which had to return having
being damaged in an encounter with an English ship. When his army
reached Edinburgh its ranks had swelled to 7,287 infantry and 300
horse.13 While there are limitations to the validity of the comparisons
that can be drawn between the sixteenth and eighteenth centuries, the
size of the two forces, and their military potential, were not dissimilar.
Of course, the Jacobite army reached Derby and gained support in
England and Ireland, thus transforming its historiographical reputation
from the localised status which the 1545 rebellion has never escaped,
even although it too should be interpreted in an archipelagic context.
The rebellion of 1545 was a by-product of Henry’s efforts to force
the Scots into accepting dynastic union with England. He sought to use
armed forces from Scotland and his newly created kingdom of Ireland
to support the English army already attacking Scotland from the south
and east. James V had died in December 1542, shortly after the Scottish
defeat at Solway Moss. He left a six-day old heir, Mary, thus creating an
unexpected opportunity for Henry to forge union through the marriage
of Mary to his son, Edward Tudor. In Scotland the royal minority and
the religious factionalism that accompanied Henry’s break with Rome
brought about divisions that were exacerbated by the proposed dynastic
union which would arise with the marriage of Mary Stewart to Edward
Tudor. James Hamilton, second earl of Arran and heir presumptive
to the throne, was a key figure in the minority administration. He
supported dynastic union with England despite opposition from a pro-
catholic and pro-French faction led by Cardinal David Beaton and Mary
of Guise, widow of James V. Arran moved quickly to negotiate the
marriage but the treaties of Greenwich, agreed on 1 July 1543, were
denounced when presented to the Scottish parliament for ratification
in December, by when Arran had realigned himself with Guise and
Beaton.14 Henry then began his so-called ‘rough wooing’ of Scotland,
intended to force the Scots into accepting dynastic union.
In the face of this onslaught the French provided assistance to
the Scots. Mary of Guise, widow of James V, was a key figure in the
12 (Continued) of Ulva, John MacLean of Ardgour, Alexander Rannaldson of Glengarry,
Allan Rannaldson of Knoydart, and Donald MacLean of Kingairloch.
13 L&P Henry VIII, xx (II), nos. 120, 819; D.G. White, ‘Henry VIII’s Irish kerne in
France and Scotland, 1544–1545’, Irish Sword 3 (1958) 213–25, at 223; Christopher
Duffy, The ’45 (London, 2003), 44–6, 206.
14 Arran was the son of his father’s second marriage and needed Beaton’s support to
secure legitimisation. See Amy Blakeway, ‘The attempted divorce of James Hamilton,
earl of Arran and governor of Scotland’, Innes Review 61 (2010) 1–23.
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ruling administration and had care of the young queen. Having
retained strong links with her Guise relations, she was determined that
her daughter’s marriage would strengthen ties with France.15 Indeed,
Francis I was just as keen as Henry VIII to have the young queen
married to his son. The French king had been watching events in
Scotland closely for some time. In March 1543, shortly after James V’s
death, he had sent Matthew Stewart, earl of Lennox, to Scotland and
in September Francis dispatched munitions and money, which Lennox
stored in Dumbarton Castle.16 Although born and raised in Scotland,
Lennox had been domiciled in France since 1532 and subsequently
acquired denizenship there. Lennox now returned to Scotland with
claims to the crown to rival those of the allegedly illegitimate Arran.17
When Arran reconciled himself with Beaton and Guise, Lennox’s
ambitions were seemingly thwarted. Moreover, Lennox’s pursuit of
his own interests, by means which included alliance with England,
alarmed the French king. Jacques de le Brosse, the French ambassador,
suggested that
in order to weaken the strength of . . . the King of England, it was most
needful . . . to draw away the said Earl of Lennox and to engage him
to serve this realm and the King [of France]. . . . in order to give the
said Earl ways and means of doing so . . . the said lady and the said
Cardinal . . . should give their consent, subject to the good pleasure of the
Estates of the said realm, to his marriage with the young Queen of Scots.18
Guise may have supported this for a time but Lennox soon transferred
his marital ambitions to her.19 When neither marriage proposal made
headway Lennox finally alienated himself from both the French king
and the Scottish government.20 He decided, instead, that his best
15 For further details see P.E. Ritchie, Mary of Guise in Scotland, 1548–1560: A Political
Career (East Linton, 2002).
16 Gladys Dickinson (ed.), ‘Discours des affaires du Royaume dEscosse depuys le jour que nous
Jacques de le Brousse Seigneur dudict lieu Eschansson de Roy et Jacques Mesnaige Docteur
es Droictz Seigneur de Caigny Conseiller dudict seigneur et ses Ambassadeurs audict Royaume
sommes arrivez a Dombertran jusqua ce jour’, in Two Missions of Jacques de la Brosse: An
Account of the Affairs of Scotland in the Year 1543 and the Journal of the Siege of Leith,
1560, Scottish History Soc. (Edinburgh, 1942), 25; A.I. Cameron (ed.), The Scottish
Correspondence of Mary of Lorraine, Scottish History Soc. (Edinburgh, 1927) [Scottish
Correspondence], nos. 27–8; Merriman, Rough Wooings, 130, 133. Lennox had been
appointed keeper of Dumbarton Castle for life in 1531.
17 The houses of Hamilton and Lennox were enemies. Sir James Hamilton of Finnart,
illegitimate son of the first earl of Arran, and half-brother of the Governor, had
killed Matthew’s father in 1526 and exploited the revenues of the earldom of Lennox
during Matthew’s minority. Their relationship remained problematic and probably
explains why Matthew went to France. As next in line to the throne of Scotland after
the Hamiltons, that family regarded the house of Lennox as a threat.
18 ‘Discours’, 29.
19 ‘Discours’, 39 suggests this was supported by the French king as a way of keeping
Lennox loyal; Robert Lindsay of Pitscottie, The Historie and Cronicles of Scotland, ed.
A.J.G. Mackay, Scottish Text Soc., 3 vols (Edinburgh, 1899–1911), ii, 16–17.
20 ‘Discours’, 29, 39. Henry had been trying to win over Lennox with promises of
marriage too: see ‘Discours’, 19, 25.
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prospects lay with an English king keen to find allies amongst the
lords of western and southern Scotland, who in turn might rebel in his
support.
The Lennox estates were situated in the west of Scotland, around
Loch Lomond; and the earl was also keeper of Dumbarton Castle. The
castle was of enormous strategic importance and dominated the Clyde,
the gateway to the west.21 Henry’s naval forces could reach friendly soil
and their invasion could cut Scotland in half, from Dumbarton in the
west to Broughty Ferry in the east.22 The French were equally aware of
the strategic importance of the west coast. As de la Brosse pointed out
to Mary of Guise and the Cardinal in 1543:
the castle of Dumbarton was almost impregnable and . . . if the Earl of
Lennox wished to hand it over to the King of England, the realm of
Scotland would run the grave danger of being utterly lost, because the
sea would be open to him [the King of England] to enter with his ships
without any opposition and in such numbers as he wishes. And once
landed he would be invincible unless a pitched battle were offered or
famine ensued.23
For Henry, the advantages of an alliance with Lennox were obvious
but the strategy was not without problem. The prevailing winds and
tidal currents in the west meant that the route from England to
Scotland via the east coast was much faster and less hazardous than
that through the Irish Sea.24 Although English ships regularly sailed
from London, Bristol and Chester with soldiers and victuals for Ireland,
systematic patrolling of the Irish Sea remained limited, usually to
periods of warfare or when the English sought to intercept shipping
between France and Scotland.25 Nevertheless, those who sought to avoid
21 Joseph Bain (ed.), The Hamilton Papers: Letters and Papers illustrating the Political
Relations of England and Scotland in the Sixteenth Century [Hamilton Papers], 2 vols
(Edinburgh, 1890–92), ii, no. 4 [7]; Marcus Merriman, ‘Stewart, Matthew, thirteenth
or fourteenth earl of Lennox (1516–1571)’, Oxford Dictionary of National Biography
(Oxford, 2004; online edn, 2006), http://www.oxforddnb.com [Oxford DNB] (accessed
30 June 2012).
22 J.E.A. Dawson, Scotland Re-formed, 1489–1587 (Edinburgh, 2007), 171. This map
shows the strength of the English forces in the south and east of Scotland and
highlights how vulnerable Scotland was, should the English attack from the west.
Henry may well have wanted to land his forces at Glasgow although Ayr was regarded
at the time as suitable and where the forces of the west were traditionally mustered
by the Scottish crown. The Jacobites in the eighteenth century also considered Ayr or
Glasgow as suitable for a western invasion.
23 Dickinson (ed.), ‘Discours’, 29.
24 For discussion of maritime activity on the east coast during this period see Murdoch,
Terror of the Seas?, 42–59.
25 David Loades, The Tudor Navy: An Administrative, Political and Military History
(Aldershot, 1992), 14, 45, 111, and esp. 144; N.A.M. Rodger, The Safeguard of the
Sea: A Naval History of Britain, 660–1649 (London, 1997), 145–6, 186. There was
some effort made to patrol the Irish waters in 1545. See H.C. Hamilton et al. (eds),
Calendar of Sate Papers Relating to Ireland of the Reigns of Henry VIII, Edward VI, Mary
and Elizabeth, 11 vols (London, 1860–1912) [CSPI], i, 72, no. 13. For much of this
the forgotten ’45 245
detection while en route between Scotland and France often journeyed
through the Irish Sea.26 Lennox himself had arrived in Dumbarton
in March 1543, having sailed, with munitions, armour and money,
unmolested ‘through an Irish Sea full of English warships’.27
The Irish Sea is a unique stretch of water with its own tidal regime,
a result of the waters of the Atlantic entering the sea from both north
and south. In the North Channel the Atlantic tides are forced into the
narrow passage between Torr Head in Antrim and Kintyre in Argyll,
making for strong tidal streams which can reach five knots. The streams
are at their weakest between the Isle of Man and St John’s Point on
the Irish coast where, one-third of the way south through the Irish Sea,
the tides from the north meet the Atlantic waters entering from the
south. These waters extend much further into the Irish Sea because St
George’s Channel is three times broader than the North Channel. Thus,
even with ‘fair winds, a day’s sail from south to north . . . will be delayed
by meeting an opposing tide at some point in the passage.’28 In short,
when relying on sail alone, even in favourable weather conditions, a
journey through the Irish Sea would take longer than its distance would
suggest. Indeed, the state papers are littered with references to delays
in the passage to and from Ireland because of ‘contrary winds’.29
For various reasons, therefore, the English regarded the Irish Sea
as a security risk. Tudor monarchs often feared invasion from the
west because France or Spain could use Ireland as a launch-pad for
attack.30 Likewise, James IV had been aware of the need to provide
greater security around western coasts, especially in the wake of
the 1493 forfeiture and the unrest that followed. He commenced a
programme of ship building and repair work at Dumbarton in the
winter of 1494–5 and in the following years he established royal
garrisons and fortifications around the coast, at, for instance, Kilkerran,
Tarbert and Ailsa Craig.31 After the outbreak of the rebellion in 1501
25 (Continued) period the only shipping dedicated to the Irish Sea was the pinnace
Popinjay. My thanks to Professor N.A.M. Rodger for discussing this with me.
26 L&P Henry VIII, xx (I), no. 1106. Mention is made of theMary Willoughby, laden with
wines and munitions, arriving in Leith having come by the Irish seas. Mary Stewart
departed from Dumbarton in 1548, arriving undetected in France by the English.
27 Merriman, ‘Stewart, Matthew, earl of Lennox’. For further examples of shipping
using the west coast see Murdoch, Terror of the Seas?, 45; Rodger, Safeguard of the Sea,
181.
28 R.H. Buchanan, ‘The Irish Sea: the geographical framework’, in Michael McCaughan
and John Appleby (eds), The Irish Sea: Aspects of Maritime History (Antrim, 1989), 3.
29 For example see CSPI, i, 312, no. 91; 313, no. 2.
30 Shortly after Henry VII gained the English throne he faced several rebellions, two of
which utilised Ireland as a base: J.D. Mackie, The Earlier Tudors, 1485–1558 (Oxford,
1952), 68–9, 116–34. In 1544 and 1545 Henry VIII was informed of rumours that
the French intended to land Gerald Fitzgerald, heir to the forfeited Kildare estates,
in Ireland to join in rebellion with the Scots against the English; see CSPI, i, 70 (nos.
47–8); 71 (no. 6).
31 Norman Macdougall, James IV (Edinburgh, 1997), 104–5, 115–16. In 1494 James
placed a royal garrison in Dunaverty Castle, on the southern tip of Kintyre, while
in 1495 construction of a castle at Loch Kilkerran, near Campbeltown, commenced.
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James acknowledged that fortification of the Clyde was inadequate.
Consequently, parliament recommended that the earl of Huntly should
build a castle at Inverlochy on Loch Linnhe and that Stornoway
should be reinforced, while Argyll was consulted about strengthening
Dunaverty, Kilkerran and Cairn-na-Burgh. The construction of Saddell
Castle and the proposal to transfer the see of Argyll from Lismore to
Saddell Abbey in 1512 was part of this same strategy to fortify the west;32
and James V reinforced defences, especially for the expedition of 1540,
when a royal garrison was established at Dunivaig and troops and canon
left on Islay.33 It was to negate these defensive developments that Henry
sought alliance with the military powers in the west. He turned initially,
in December 1543, to Archibald, fourth earl of Argyll, regarded by the
English as ‘a man of wytte and force’.34
Argyll was married to Lady Helen Hamilton, daughter of the first
earl of Arran and half-sister to the regent. Henry tried to pitch blood
against marital kinship and Hugh Campbell of Loudoun, sheriff of Ayr,
was enlisted to persuade Argyll of the benefits of an English alliance.35
With the prospect of Anglo-Scottish hostility looming, Loudoun
argued that ‘inclyning to [Henry’s] . . . devocion, maye have noo small
ayde . . . if incase they of the Ile shall chaunce to rebel’ because the
king had ‘Irelande in suche subjection . . . whiche maye ayde hym at
all tymes’.36 Henry sent 1,000 crowns to Loudon, to be offered as an
annual pension to Argyll, while the earls of Huntly and Moray were
also to be approached for an accommodation.37 Argyll did not take the
bait. On 8 March 1544 Hertford asked Henry for ‘x or xii shipps well
eskypped and furnished, by the west sees, to do some annoyance to
thErll of Argile’.38
Argyll’s rejection of English overtures was not simply a sign of
loyalty to his wife’s kindred, the Hamiltons. In the fifteenth century the
Campbells and the MacDonalds had co-existed largely harmoniously
and, although Campbell influence in the west had grown, this had not
31 (Continued) During his three naval expeditions of 1498 James visited his fortresses of
Kilkerran and Tarbert, at the mouth of Clyde.
32 I.G. MacDonald, Clergy and Clansmen: The Diocese of Argyll, c.1189–1560 (Leiden,
forthcoming).
33 Cameron, James V, 228–54.
34 Hamilton Papers, ii, no. 131 [215]. Although a traditional Highland clan, the Campbell
chief was an important national magnate too, at times holding offices of state. Sir
Ralph Sadler, resident ambassador in Scotland at this time, must have encouraged
Henry to approach Argyll. On 11 July 1543 he wrote that Argyll was ‘well minded
to the increase of the amity’ between England and Scotland and ‘to the uniting and
conjunction of them’ through the marriage of Mary and Edward. See Arthur Clifford
(ed.), The State Papers and Letters of Sir Ralph Sadler, 3 vols (Edinburgh, 1806), i, 227.
35 The Campbells of Loudoun were a cadet branch of the main Campbell clan. Hugh
Campbell, sheriff of Ayr, was still trying to win Scots over to Henry’s side in 1545. See
L&P Henry VIII, xx (I), no. 438.
36 Hamilton Papers, ii, no. 131 [217]. See also nos. 135, 137–8.
37 Hamilton Papers, ii, no. 135 [221–2]. In December 1543 it was believed that the earls
of Moray and Argyll would switch sides.
38 Hamilton Papers, ii, no. 183 [294].
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brought the families into significant conflict.39 Donald Dubh had spent
the early years of his life in the first earl of Argyll’s custody at Innis
Chonnell. Traditionally this has been interpreted as an ‘imprisonment’
but Argyll had not simply acted as a royal agent.40 Although the crown
had relied heavily upon Argyll to suppress the early risings in the Isles,
the earl displayed reluctance to take firm action, preferring negotiation
rather than force in his dealings with the Islesmen.41 Moreover, while
the crown took decisive action against the MacDonalds, successive earls
built up ties with former lordship clans. Colin, third earl, collaborated
with Lauchlan MacLean of Duart and Alexander MacLeod of Dunvegan
in seeking to resolve the 1517 rebellion.42 At the same time connections
between the Campbells and other clans were reinforced.43 The first signs
of MacDonald resentment towards the Campbells are only visible in
1529, when Alexander MacDonald of Dunivaig rebelled, and even this
has been interpreted as merely a personal dispute about the MacIan
inheritance.44 Nevertheless, in the wake of the rebellion, James V
worked closely with MacDonald and Hector MacLean of Duart during
the 1530s, deliberately keeping Argyll out of the west, a move which
further questions the dominant historiography of Clan Donald’s demise
and Clan Campbell’s rise.45 Nevertheless, by the time of James V’s death
Argyll had been rehabilitated into the political elite and, by taking his
place in the minority government, the earl arguably saw his role as
defender of Scottish, rather than local, regional or personal interests.
If Argyll’s stance caused Henry frustration, a solution soon emerged.
In January 1544 Lennox completed his volte-face and initiated
negotiations with the English king. Lennox now sided with the
pro-English, pro-union lords of the south-west, including Archibald
Douglas, sixth earl of Angus, William Cunningham, third earl of
Glencairn, and Gilbert Kennedy, third earl of Cassillis. Crucially for
Henry, Lennox and his allies could provide much needed armed power
39 Colin, first earl, and Archibald, second earl, were appointed to positions within the
government while Campbell influence at Iona continued. See Steer and Bannerman,
Monumental Sculpture, 210–11; and Boardman, Campbells, 1–8.
40 See Boardman, Campbells, 278–83.
41 Cathcart, ‘A spent force?’; Boardman, Campbells, 278–83.
42 J.M. Thomson et al. (eds), Registrum Magni Sigilii Scotorum, 11 vols (Edinburgh,
1882–1914), i, no. 2873; R.K. Hannay (ed.), Acts of the Lords of Council in Public Affairs,
1510–1554 (Edinburgh, 1932), 78–82, 86–90.
43 J.M. Wormald, Lords and Men in Scotland: Bonds of Manrent, 1442–1603 (Edinburgh,
1985), App. A, 179 (no.8); Cosmo Innes (ed.), The Book of the Thanes of Cawdor:
A Series of Papers Selected from the Charter Room at Cawdor, 1236–1742, Spalding
Club (Edinburgh, 1859), 123–4, 128–9, 131, 133–41, 144–6; Steer and Bannerman,
Monumental Sculpture, 211–12; Jane Dawson, “‘There is Nothing Like a Good Gossip’’:
baptism, kinship and alliance in early modern Scotland’, Review of Scottish Culture 15
(2002) 88–95, at 91; Cameron, James V, 228.
44 For more on this, see Cameron, James V, 232–42, although compare with D.H.
Caldwell, Islay, Jura and Colonsay: A Historical Guide (Edinburgh, 2011), 82.
45 Cameron, James V, 235–9; Alison Cathcart, ‘James V, king of Scotland – and Ireland?’
in Seán Duffy (ed.), The World of the Galloglass: Kings, Warlords and Warriors in Ireland
and Scotland, 1200–1600 (Dublin, 2007), 127–40.
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in the west. During the next year Lennox used his Highland tenants to
Henry’s advantage and subsequently acted as middle-man between the
king and the island chiefs.
It has been suggested that Henry’s use of Islesmen was first proposed
in a letter, dated 1542/3, written by one John Elder, who signed
himself ‘a Redshank’.46 Elder was educated in Skye and Lewis before
spending twelve years studying at St Andrews, Aberdeen and Glasgow.
He ingratiated himself and the Islesmen with Henry by referring to
the ‘loue and fauour the valiant Yrishe lordes of Scotland, other wayes
called the Reddshankes’ had for the king because of how he had:
vsed, orderide, and dealide with the lordes of Irland, ther nyghboures . . .
perdonyng and forgiving theame ther offences and trespasses; creating of
them, some erlis, some lordes, and some barons; rewarding theame more
like princis then erlis and lordis, with gold, siluer, and riches; and sending
theame home agane with gorgeous indumentis, and rich apparell.47
While asserting the loyalty of the Highlanders to the English king, Elder
was, however, careful not to portray either himself or the Highlanders
as disloyal subjects of the Scottish crown. He argued that if James V
were still alive or had left ‘a Prynce lawfully begotten of his body’
then he ‘wolde in no manner of wise presume to shaw and declair
the privities of Scotlande to no Prynce Christen’. In other words, the
absence of an adult monarch, combined with the ‘miserable estate’ that
had resulted from the minority government’s association with ‘proud
papisticall buschops’, had pushed Elder and the Islesmen towards
Henry. By disassociating the Islesmen from treason Elder was deploying
a familiar tactic in Scotland. Minority government was something to
which Scots were accustomed and disgruntled nobles often took the
opportunity presented by a minority to make good losses incurred
under the previous regime. Thus, rebellion was not directed against
the crown, but rather against the ruling administration. Indeed, while
the former lordship clans did not relish greater crown intervention,
this was significantly more preferable than governmental intrusion
by a relatively weak and divided administration. As Gregory argued,
James V’s death exposed the Highlands and Isles to ‘domestic feuds
between the powerful factions’ at the heart of the minority government,
whereas James V’s adult reign had ‘promised an assurance of a more
lengthened period of repose than the Isles had hitherto enjoyed’.48
46 Gregory,Western Highlands, 155–6. Redshank was a term of limited usage in Scots and
it is likely that Elder deployed a word familiar to the English. For further definitions
see the Oxford English Dictionary, http://www.oed.com/ and the Dictionary of the Scots
Language, http://www.dsl.ac.uk/dsl/. Elder was from Caithness, a Gaelic-speaking area
at this time, which is why he referred to himself as a Redshank.
47 ‘A Proposal for uniting Scotland with England, addressed to King Henry VIII by
John Elder, Clerke, a Redshank, 1542 or 1543’, in D. Gregory and W.F. Skene (eds),
Collectanea de Rebus Albanicis, Iona Club (Edinburgh, 1847), 23–32.
48 Gregory, Western Highlands, 149–50.
the forgotten ’45 249
This loyalty to the crown was reiterated by Rory MacAllister and Patrick
MacLean, commissioners for Donald Dubh, in subsequent negotiations
with Henry.49
It has been argued that Elder’s protestant outlook explains his
desire that the ‘realms of England and of Scotlande may be joined
in one’ with Henry as ‘superioure and kynge’.50 If so, Elder managed
to intertwine his own views with the rather different motives of the
Islesmen. For Elder their antagonism towards Argyll was because the
earl was ‘novrisshed and brought vp’ by Cardinal Beaton and the
bishops.51 Yet, one modern assessment reckoned that for the Islesmen
‘religion ostensibly was not a factor’.52 Instead, the rent increases which
followed the Act of Annexation caused resentment. So too had increased
intervention in the region by the crown’s agents, the Campbells and
the Gordons. And perhaps too restoration of the lordship stimulated
discontent. In negotiations with Henry, Donald was referred to as ‘Lord
of ye Ilis and Erll of Roiss’, harking back to an era when the lordship
was at its fullest extent, while the rebellion of 1545 was supported
enthusiastically by former lordship clans.53 Of course, the reason for the
Islesmen’s discontent was probably not of any great interest to Henry. It
did matter that many Islesmen had been alienated by James V and the
minority administration; and that the malcontents were potential allies.
It was Sir Ralph Sadler, Henry’s resident ambassador in Scotland,
who recognised that Dumbarton and the Firth of Clyde were the ‘kaye
of the North’.54 This was perhaps reinforced by the ‘plotte’ (or map,
now lost) that accompanied Elder’s letter.55 In providing a map, Elder
was pandering to an English king increasingly concerned with the
49 L&P Henry VIII, xx (I), no. 294 [135]; Rory MacAllister (brother of the captain of
the Clanranald, bishop elect of the Isles and dean of Morvern) and Patrick MacLean
(brother of MacLean of Duart, bailie of Icolmkill and justice clerk of the South Isles)
were the commissioners appointed by Donald to negotiate with Henry.
50 R.A. Mason, Kingship and the Commonweal: Political Thought in Renaissance and
Reformation Scotland (East Linton, 1998), 252–3, where Elder is described as a
protestant zealot; Marcus Merriman, ‘James Henrisoun and ‘Great Britain’; British
Union and the Scottish Commonweal’, in R.A. Mason (ed.), Scotland and England,
1286–1815 (Edinburgh, 1987), 89, 98 where [at 89] it is stated that Elder was forced
to leave Dundee because of his reforming views; James Kirk, ‘The Jacobean church in
the Highlands, 1567–1625’, in Loraine Maclean (ed.), The Seventeenth Century in the
Highlands (Inverness, 1986), 27.
51 Opportunistically he had converted back to catholicism by 1555, publishing on 1
January of that year The copie of a letter sent in to Scotlande, of the arivall and marryage of
Philippe, prynce of Spaine to Marye quene of England, whereunto is added a brefe overture of
Cardinall Poole . . . for reconcilement to the catholyke churche. See Marcus Merriman, ‘Elder,
John (fl. 1533–1565)’, Oxford DNB (accessed 30 June 2012).
52 Kirk, ‘Jacobean church’, 27.
53 L&P Henry VIII, xx (I), no. 1298; for motivations of the Islesmen in earlier risings
see Cathcart, ‘A spent force?’.
54 Hamilton Papers, ii, no. 4 [7].
55 Alexander Lindsay, A Rutter of the Scottish Seas (ca. 1540), edd. I.H. Adams and G.
Fortune, National Maritime Museum (Greenwich, 1980), 38. It is suggested that
Elder’s map provided Lindsay with much-needed information regarding the north
and west of Scotland and the western Isles.
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acquisition of geographical knowledge about Scotland while he planned
for its invasion.56 Before the mid-sixteenth century most of England’s
navigational tracts were translations of continental manuscripts. Most
maps were also of foreign origin.57 Although the best map-makers were
Flemish, protestant French cosmographers and navigators had sought
refuge in England and many found ready employment at Henry’s court,
where their knowledge was exploited eagerly. It has been suggested
that by the end of his reign as many as sixty French mariners and
pilots were in Henry’s service.58 Unfortunately for the king, French
cartographical knowledge of Scotland was focused primarily upon the
east coast. Familiarity with the Irish Sea – awareness of its tides, currents
and military potential – resided instead with the Islesmen. Although
the English possessed galleys and pinnaces, their larger sailing vessels,
constructed according to continental models, found the waters of
the Irish Sea difficult to navigate. The Highland galley, or birlinn,
descended from the Viking longship, was much more reliable and
manoeuvrable in these waters. Clinker-built, preferably from oak, with
a sharp stem and stern, a single mast and a rear or stern-rudder, such
vessels had both oars and a square sail and were perfectly suited to
the tide and weather conditions of the Irish Sea. The shallow draught
allowed for easy manoeuvrability in sheltered coastal areas, inland rivers
and sea lochs; but it was simultaneously deep enough to allow for safe
crossing of a short but turbulent body of water. The combination of sail
and oar was the key to successful raiding: in favourable weather sail
was effective but the ability to revert to oar for a quick get-away, should
conditions change, was highly advantageous.
Clan chiefs maintained their own birlinns and galleys, a source of
strength that successive Scottish monarchs had sought to exploit for
their own ends from as early as the time of Robert I (1306–29).59
Similarly, for many lords of Ayrshire and Galloway naval strength was
of immense importance for commerce, fishing and defence. That in
1531 William Cunningham, master of Glencairn, offered to furnish five
ships to assist King Christian II of Denmark illustrates the naval power
of just one western lord. Cunningham’s naval interests were evident on
56 Henry is likely to have asked Elder for a map. Elder may be the ‘Skottishe docter
learned in the lawe cyvell’, mentioned by John Dudley, Viscount Lisle, in a letter to
Henry VIII, dated at Alnwick Castle in December 1542. See Hamilton Papers, i, no.
255 [331].
57 E.G.R. Taylor, Tudor Geography, 1485–1583 (London, 1930), 4.
58 Taylor, Tudor Geography, 4, 13, 15–16; Lindsay, Rutter, 23, 28. Even The Rutter of the Sea
(1528) was based on the first translation of Pierre Garcie’s La routier de la mer (Rouen,
1502–10), although it is likely that the Scottish material in Lindsay’s rutter was based
on an earlier Scottish rutter.
59 Robert used the maritime strength of the Highlanders and Islesmen in 1315, when
his brother, Edward, invaded Ireland. Galley service was regularly mentioned in the
charters of the Campbells of Argyll. See, for example, Inveraray, Castle Archives,
Argyll Transcripts, iv, 29 July 1533; 10 May 1550; Steve Boardman, ‘The Campbells
and charter lordship in Medieval Argyll’, in Boardman and Ross (eds), Power in
Medieval Scotland, 113–4.
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other occasions too. In 1538 he escorted the king’s new bride, Mary
of Guise, from France to Scotland and his son, Alexander, master of
Kilmaurs, was appointed vice-admiral of James’s expedition to the Isles
in 1540.60 It is little wonder that external powers now courted men with
such significant maritime power.
Care should be taken not to distinguish too greatly between
Highlanders, Islesmen and south-western lords with whom Lennox
also had close ties.61 Gaelic was spoken across a region stretching
as far as Ireland which was bound by water and the communication
which it facilitated.62 Lennox, his south-western allies and others too
possessed estates that straddled what became known as the Highland-
Lowland divide. With both Gaelic and non-Gaelic tenants, landlords
would have moved easily between the two areas.63 Moreover, both the
Campbells and the MacDonalds maintained close connections with
Ayrshire and Galloway families.64 Before 1493 the lords of the Isles
held the lands of Greenan, in Ayrshire, where their main tenants were
the Davidsons.65 The main line of Campbells had marital connections
with the Montgomery family;66 and in 1536 Elizabeth, daughter of
60 Denis Hay (ed), Letters of James V (Edinburgh, 1954), 186–7, 198–9, 364; RSS, ii, no.
4631; L&P Henry VIII, xv, no. 634; R.K. Hannay (ed.), Acts of the Lords of Council in
Public Affairs, 1501–1554: Selections from the Acta Dominorum Concilii (Edinburgh, 1932),
504; ER, xvii, 625, 626, 630–1; D.E.R. Watt and A.L. Murray, Fasti ecclesiae Scoticanae
medii aevi ad annum 1638 (Edinburgh, 2003), 27; RMS, iii, nos. 345, 2816; Thomas
Dickson and J.B. Paul et al. (eds), Account of the Lord High Treasurer of Scotland, 13 vols
(Edinburgh, 1877–1978), vii, 400.
61 Writing about the fifteenth century, Boardman refers to the last group by the
contemporary designation of ‘westland’ lords. The ‘westland’ included Cunningham,
Lanarkshire and probably other areas around the Clyde, such as Kyle and
Renfrewshire. The ‘lords of the westland’ engaged in occasional political and military
activity in Argyll, the Clyde islands and Hebrides. They often acted in association
with Gaelic lords from the latter areas. See Stephen Boardman, “‘Pillars of the
community’’: Campbell lordship and architectural patronage in the fifteenth century’,
in R.D. Oram and Geoffrey Stell (eds), Lordship and Architecture in Medieval and
Renaissance Scotland (Edinburgh, 2005), 123–59, at 138, n. 45.
62 Aonghas MacCoinnich, ‘Where and how was Gaelic written in late medieval and
early modern Scotland? Orthographic practices and cultural identities’, Scottish Gaelic
Studies 24 (2008) 309–56, at 314–15, n. 15.
63 Gregory, Western Highlands, 166–9; Michael Brown, ‘Earldom and kindred: the
Lennox and its earls, 1200–1458’, in Boardman and Ross (eds), Power in Medieval
Scotland, 201–24; MacCoinnich, ‘Where and how was Gaelic written?’ The division
between east and west was much more blurred in the sixteenth century than today.
For Gaelic poetry from the Lennox in the early sixteenth century, see Wilson McLeod
and Meg Bateman (eds), Duanaire na Sracaire. Songbook of the Pillagers: Anthology of
Scotland’s Gaelic Verse to 1600 (Edinburgh, 2007), 266–7, 366–71.
64 Jean Munro and R.W. Munro (eds), Acts of the Lord of the Isles, Scottish History Soc.
(Edinburgh, 1986), xxxviii, 96, 298.
65 Acts of the Lords of the Isles, nos. A40, A68; Norman Macdougall, ‘Achilles’ heel? The
earldom of Ross, the lordship of the Isles and the Stewart kings, 1449–1507’, in E.J.
Cowan and R.A. McDonald (eds), Alba: Celtic Scotland in the Medieval Era (East Linton,
2000), 265–6.
66 Macdougall, James IV, 97–9. These contacts extended into the ecclesiastical sphere.
Montgomery and Cunningham clergy were related through marriage to the earls of
Argyll and the Campbells of Loudoun. See MacDonald, Clergy and Clansmen.
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John Campbell of West Loudoun, married William Cunningham, third
earl of Glencairn.67 The third earl had risen to prominence because
of his service in the west, which had included acting as the king’s
commissioner and surveyor of crown lands in Kintyre in the early 1540s.
Others performed similar service: Archibald Stewart of Bute was, for
example, made captain of the castle of Dunivaig on Islay.68
In March 1544 Lennox, Angus, Cassillis and Glencairn sent
commissioners to treat at Carlisle with Thomas, first Baron Wharton,
and Sir Robert Bowes, commissioners appointed by Henry VIII.69
Before agreement was reached Henry acquired ‘cause to be dissuaded’:
Angus was not to be included because of his ‘manifest appearance of
untruth’ and Cassillis had switched sides, returning to Arran’s fold.70
Lennox and Glencairn remained, however, useful. On 17May 1544 they
acknowledged Henry as ‘King Director and Protector of Scotland’;71and
on 28 May, leaving Glencairn at Dumbarton, Lennox sailed to London
where the agreement reached at Carlisle was formalised on 26 June.72 In
addition, Lennox agreed to deliver Dumbarton Castle, Rothesay Castle
and the isle of Bute to the English king, and to serve Henry ‘as his
subject, against all who impugn his right, title and authority in Scotland
or offend him in any dominions in his possession, or to which he has
any title’. In return Henry granted Lennox the marriage of Margaret
Douglas, the king’s niece, and agreed that when he gained ‘the direction
and rule of Scotland’ Lennox would be appointed governor.73 On 29
June the marriage took place at St James’s Palace and on 10 July
Lennox became an English subject.74
Later in July 1544 henry equipped Lennox with sixteen ships and
600 soldiers for an expedition to secure the Dumbarton garrison.
Lennox took Rothesay Castle on Bute before reaching Dumbarton
although securing his own castle was not straightforward. While Lennox
had been in England Mary of Guise had won Glencairn over and
plans were laid to take Lennox prisoner when he returned. On
arrival Lennox became suspicious and withdrew before he could be
apprehended.75 Although unable to take the castle he did not leave
67 H.L. MacQueen and John Simmons, ‘Cunningham family (per. c.1340–1631)’, Oxford
DNB (accessed 30 June 2012.
68 M. Livingstone (ed.), Registrum Secreti Sigilli Regum Scotorum, 1488–1580 (Edinburgh,
1908-) [RSS], ii, no. 4628.
69 L&P Henry VIII, xix (I), no. 243 The commissioners sent to treat with Wharton and
Bowes were Mr John Penven, a chaplain, and Mr Thomas Bishop, Lennox’s secretary.
70 L&P Henry VIII, xix (I), no. 337 [220].
71 L&P Henry VIII, xix (I), no. 522. The commissioners who agreed this indenture in
May were the earl of Glencairn himself, Robert, bishop elect of Caithness, brother of
the earl of Lennox, Thomas Bishop and Hugh Cunningham.
72 L&P Henry VIII, xix (I), no. 779.
73 L&P Henry VIII, xix (I), nos. 337, 779. Margaret Douglas was the daughter of
Margaret Tudor, widow of James IV, and Archibald Douglas, sixth earl of Angus.
74 Merriman, ‘Stewart, Matthew, earl of Lennox’.
75 For Glencairn’s re-alignment and peace with Mary of Guise see Scottish Correspondence,
nos. 76–7, 84.
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Scotland frustrated. Prior to his departure from London, the queen’s
council at Hampton Court informed Lennox: ‘at your commeng home,
you shuld fynde M’Farlane and the hieghland men redy to join with
you’.76 The Macfarlanes were tenants of Lennox, inhabiting lands
around Arrochar.77 They were presumably among over one hundred
Highlanders who joined Lennox’s force before he left Dumbarton.
Rather than retreat to England in defeat, he caused havoc along the
shore of the Clyde, attacking Dunoon and wasting other parts of Argyll,
including Kintyre.78
Although Glencairn, Cassillis and Angus wavered in their allegiance
to Henry, the ruling administration in Scotland was not complacent
about the threat which Lennox posed. More alarmingly still, Donald
Dubh had gained his liberty in uncertain circumstances. Sadler made
no mention of Donald’s release when he recorded on 19 August 1543
that Arran had released ‘certayne Irishe men . . . long prisoners in the
castellis of Edinburgh and Dunbar’ and sent them ‘home onlye of
policye . . . to hold the said erle of Argyll occupied’.79 The suggestion
is that their release was arranged by Arran and other enemies of
Argyll, including Glencairn, Cassillis and Angus, who resented Argyll’s
refusal to join with the English faction.80 Indeed, Glencairn may also
have harboured personal grievances against Argyll. Glencairn had
acquired lands in Kintyre from James V and in 1543 his son, the
master of Kilmaurs, was appointed as governor of Kintyre for one
year.81 This would not have been welcomed by Argyll who, in October
1542, was confirmed as justice, sheriff, coroner and chamberlain of the
lands and lordship of Kintyre and Knapdale. In early 1543 Argyll was
granted Dunaverty Castle, further expanding Campbell influence in the
region and frustrating intentions Glencairn may have harboured for his
family’s expansion into Kintyre.82
If the chiefs and hostages were liberated before Donald Dubh, this
may explain the account in the ‘Book of Clanranald’ which stated that
76 Hamilton Papers, ii, no. 296. This was information provided by Glencairn who, at that
time, was allied to Mary of Guise against Lennox.
77 W.C. Mackenzie, The Highlands and Isles of Scotland: A Historical Survey (Edinburgh,
1949), 141–2, 142 n. 20, where it is argued that Lennox had considerable ‘Highland
assistance’(Cosmo Innes and J.B. Brichan (eds), Origines Parochiales Scotiae, Bannatyne
Club, 2 vols (Edinburgh, 1850–55), ii, pt 1). The Macfarlanes, similar to other Lennox
kindreds descended from the comital line, looked to the earls as natural lords and
superiors. Usually known as the MacFarlanes of Arrochar, residing on the northern
shore of Loch Long, they had maritime access to the Firth of Clyde.
78 L&P Henry VIII, xix (I), no. 813; xix (II), no. 186; Hamilton Papers, ii, no. 317;
Donaldson, Scotland, 70; Gregory, Western Highlands, 164–7.
79 Edinburgh, National Library of Scotland [NLS], Adv. MS. 33.3.10, fo. 232v; Sadler
Papers, i, 266–7.
80 Hamilton Papers, ii, no. 135 [222].
81 ER, xvii, 626, 630–1; RSS, ii, no. 4631.
82 Relations between Glencairn and Argyll deteriorated further when Argyll (among
others) received a commission of April 1544 to take Glencairn’s ‘housse and strenthis’
and keep them in the crown’s name (Inveraray, Castle Archives, Letters & Papers of the
Family of Argyll (Edinburgh, 1875), ii, nos. 26–7).
254 alison cathcart
Donald was liberated by a ‘Fenian exploit’ on the part of the men
of Glencoe.83 Donald had, in other words, escaped against the will of
the government.84 Other evidence suggests, however, that Donald was
released at the same time as the other prisoners. James Stewart, earl
of Moray, wrote to Mary of Guise from Dingwall on 2 November 1543
stating that ‘the cuntre men is uncertane of pourpois . . . of the fredome
of the Lord of Ilis’.85 But if Donald had been released with the other
prisoners in August 1543, he could not have agreed a truce with Argyll
in March 1543.86 Donald’s movements remain, then, uncertain and
little is heard of his activities until late 1544.87
News of Donald’s rebellious activity was broken to Mary of Guise on
24 October 1544, when she was informed by the countess of Moray
that ‘the Lord of the Ilis is broken forth’.88 Bannerman interpreted this
as Donald launching an attack on Ross, which suggests that following
release he had headed north.89 In 1501, when released from Innis
Chonnell, Donald had made for his uncle, Torquil MacLeod of Lewis,
and in 1544 Donald seemingly once again headed for sympathetic
kin and friends. News of the unrest spread quickly. In December
1544 Henry VIII’s envoy, Alexander Crichton, laird of Brunston, had
enquired of Francis Talbot, fifth earl of Shrewsbury, then serving on the
Borders and negotiating with individual Scots, ‘geif Donnald of the Illis
keipis his Yuill’ at Inverness.90 On 31 December 1544 Stephen Vaughan,
Henry’s financial agent in Antwerp, noted that a ‘Scot told me here that
he heard say that there should be risen a new king in Scotland out of the
Scottyshe Irysshe’.91Such rumours were given credence by Sir Anthony
St Leger, lord deputy of Ireland, who in February 1545 reported to the
council in London that:
the Scots will send one McOnell, of the Isles, with many Wilde Scots to
land in the North of this land, where Young Geralde [Fitzgerald], by aid
of the Frenchmen, will arrive.92
83 ‘The Book of Clanranald’, 163. Donald may have been assisted in his escape after the
release of those imprisoned by James V.
84 L&P Henry VIII, xx (II), 294 [185]. Boardman, Campbells, 282, 282 n. 112, which
demonstrates that Gregory’s account of Donald Dubh (see Western Highlands, 95–6,
155) stems from a ‘conflation of the Sleat and Clanranald account’.
85 Scottish Correspondence, no. 34.
86 NLS, Adv. MS. 33.3.10, fo. 154r; Sadler Papers, i, 192; L&P Henry VIII, xx (I), no. 664.
87 ‘Discours’, 17–19 mentions that in 1543 ‘two lords of the Isles, near Dumbarton, had
five or six thousand wild men who each day carried out raids and wrought havoc by
fire or other ways, on the lands and subjects of the Earl of Argyll, in Scotland, with
whom they were at feud’. I would argue that this, and Sadler’s reference to the ‘erle
of the Isles’ (n.101 above), does not relate to Donald Dubh but another member of
the MacDonalds. Other comments by Sadler in his papers suggest that at times he is
referring to events in 1544 despite them being dated to 1543. My thanks to Dr Amy
Blakeway for discussing this point with me.
88 L&P Henry VIII, xix (II), App. 12.
89 Steer and Bannerman, Monumental Sculpture, 212, n. 15.
90 Hamilton Papers, ii, no. 391 [536]; L&P Henry VIII, xix (II), no. 790.
91 L&P Henry VIII, xix (II), no. 795.
92 L&P Henry VIII, xx (I), no. 273.
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Gerald, the remaining heir to the forfeited Kildare earldom in Ireland,
had been sent to France a few years earlier for his safety following the
failure of the Geraldine rebellion and the subsequent execution of all
those involved.93 In response to the rumours St Leger asked the king
for ships to defend the waters of the north of Ireland against both the
French and the Islesmen. The fear was of Irish rebellion, led by the
exiled heir to the forfeited Kildare earldom, supported by Islesmen,
led by the heir to the forfeited lordship of the Isles. An attack of this
magnitude might have proven fatal to Henry’s ambitions, not least since
he had lost the support of the lords of the south-west.
These concerns were alleviated by the arrival at court of Patrick
MacLean, a messenger dispatched from ‘the Lord of the Isles’. MacLean
had been initially sent to Lennox, since December 1544 in Carlisle,
where he could ‘more advance our affairs . . . to practise with the
Scots . . . “sow devision amonge them’’ or at least to get intelligence’.94
After discussion with Lennox, MacLean headed south. It was, therefore,
in early 1545 that direct communication between Henry and the
Islesmen commenced. On 12 March Henry told Lennox to do ‘anything
for the advancement of the King’s affairs,’ sending 800 crowns as a
reward for Donald although it was left to Lennox’s discretion when
the money should be delivered.95 In the interim, waiting for a response
from the English king, Donald agreed to a truce with Argyll and Huntly,
to last until 1 May 1545, and he even promised to visit the queen
at Stirling.96 On discovering this, the English expressed concern and
Lennox was advised on 27 March not to hand over the 800 crowns until
sure that Donald would ‘remayne firme and constant’ in his alliance
with Henry.97 Shortly after reports reached London that the truce had
expired and that Argyll and Donald Dubh were both preparing to attack
each other.98
As well as preparing to harry the lands of Argyll and Huntly, Donald
had been cultivating his connections with Hugh O’Neill, head of the
mighty Tyrone kindred, as a means of demonstrating his loyalty to the
English. On 6 May St Leger informed the council in London that:
the earl of Tyrone, being now at Dublin, declares that McConell has
desired him to petition the King to accept him to his service. Tyrone says
that McConell is mortal enemy to the earl of Argyle . . . [who] since the
king’s death is enlarged and grown to great power’.99
93 For more on this see S.G. Ellis, ‘The Kildare rebellion and the early Henrician
Reformation’, Historical Journal 19 (1976) 807–30; M.A. Lyons, Gearóid Óg, The Ninth
Earl of Kildare (Dublin, 1988); Cathcart, ‘James V’; Mícheál Ó Siochrú, ‘Foreign
involvement in the revolt of Silken Thomas, 1534–5’, Proceedings of the Royal Irish
Academy 96 C:2 (1996) 49–66.
94 L&P Henry VIII, xix (II), no. 719.
95 L&P Henry VIII, xx (I), nos. 285, 347–8. Patrick MacLean was brother of MacLean of
Duart, bailie of Icolmkill and justice clerk of the South Isles and see n. 49, above.
96 L&P Henry VIII, xx (I), no. 382; Hamilton Papers, ii, no. 428 [583].
97 Hamilton Papers, ii, no. 432.
98 L&P Henry VIII, xx (I), nos. 642, 664.
99 L&P Henry VIII, xx (I), no. 665.
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While the Islesmen may have caused problems for Argyll and Huntly
in recent months, this is the first specific indication of MacDonald
resentment towards Argyll. Donald singled the earl out as an enemy,
along with ‘all that were friends to the Scottish king that dead is’. This
statement harks back to John Elder’s letter which emphasised that the
Islesmen were not disloyal to the Scottish crown but rather to the ruling
administration. They were loyal to monarchical authority – but since
James V was dead, they now looked to Henry.
Negotiations progressed rapidly. On 28 July 1545 a commission was
drawn up at ‘Ellencarne’, the island in Loch Ballygrant on Islay, in
which Donald Dubh, styled ‘Lord of ye Ilis and Erll of Roiss’, elected
two plenipotentiaries to negotiate with Henry.100 The commission was
subscribed by all the island chiefs except James MacDonald of Dunivaig
and Torquil MacNeill of Gigha. Torquil was an old man and his absence
and that of his, Niall, is often overlooked.101 MacDonald’s brother,
Angus, was present and is usually regarded as a proxy for James. This
should not be accepted without question. Angus and James grew up
separately and Angus may have joined the rebellion regardless of his
brother’s opposition or neutrality. James had been brought up at court
and was married to Agnes Campbell, Argyll’s sister. James had sought
security of his Scottish lands through his marital connections but his
younger sibling sought to obtain title from Henry for his lands in the
Glens of Antrim. While the two brothers had a similar aim, that of
securing title to land, they were working to very different agenda, a
possible pre-cursor to the split in the clan that would occur later in the
sixteenth century.102
By early August 1545 the island chiefs, with a force of 4,000 Scots,
were at Carrickfergus on the east Antrim coast, a place ‘more propice
for them to serve the King against the Scots than any port in their own
land’.103 Here they swore an oath of allegiance to Henry and honed
the finer details of the agreement. Throughout the negotiations the
Islesmen added legitimacy to their cause by consistently referring to
Lennox as ‘true governor’ and ‘second person’ of Scotland, thereby
attempting to discredit the ruling administration.104 In addition,
Donald Dubh and the Islesmen agreed to support the marriage of
Mary and Edward and to keep Argyll and Huntly militarily engaged.105
100 L&P Henry VIII, xx (I), no. 1298; Caldwell, Islay, 83. The island belonged to the
MacLeans of Duart and in many ways resembled the Council Isle at Finlaggan. For
the commissioners see n. 49, above.
101 See, however, Steer and Bannerman, Monumental Sculpture, 212–13.
102 George Hill, An Historical Account of the Macdonnells of Antrim (Belfast, 1873), 41–5.
103 L&P Henry VIII, xx (II), nos. 120–1. Carrickfergus was familiar to Scots and only a
short sail across the North Channel. The failure to capture Dumbarton Castle meant
it was safer for the force to assemble in Carrickfergus. In Scotland it would have been
watched closely as the privy council was well aware of the dealings between Donald
Dubh and Henry.
104 L&P Henry VIII, xix (II), no. 1298; xx (II), nos. 40–1.
105 L&P Henry VIII, xx (I), no. 642 (2 May 1545), regarding the ‘earl of Ellis’ who will
keep Huntly and Argyll ‘occupied’ and showing that Donald Dubh took action against
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This would be achieved through the provision of a force of 8,000
Scotsmen, half at Carrickfergus while the remainder kept watch on
events in Scotland. Henry would assist by sending 2,000 kerne and
galloglass under leadership of the earl of Ormond.106 Their objective in
Scotland ‘besides generall annoyances to be doon in burning herieng
and spoiling’ was ‘thannoyaunce of the said Erll of Argiles countrey’.107
In addition, Lennox was to be furnished with a cannon, artillery and
munitions, while 3,000 of the Scots forces were to receive a wage for two
months.108
This was easier said than done. Despite Henry’s orders, the Irish
council in Dublin was in no position to carry his instructions out. It
continually requested money from England with which to pay the Scots
and early in October 1545, with Lennox on his way to Ireland to join
the expedition, the council stated that it was not ready to provide men,
ships, arms, or money.109 In future it requested ‘longer notice of the
king’s wish to use the service of Irishmen whose captains must keep
their countries furnished with men against the neighbours, for this land
is not like England’.110 The delay in assembling the provisions and force
from Ireland was too great for the Islesmen who returned to Scotland
to await the arrival of Lennox and the Irish. They were wary of lengthy
absence from Scotland and anxious to protect their own lands. But the
unity of the Islesmen was under threat too. Henry’s payments had not
been distributed ‘to the satisfaction of all’ and following disagreement
the force disbanded.111 Lennox finally arrived in Ireland on 10 October
1545 by when the Islesmen had returned home.112 Lennox wrote to
Donald Dubh, telling him to prepare for rebellion, but it was not until
15 November that, accompanied by Ormond and the force of 400
105 (Continued) Argyll immediately after the end of the truce. According to ibid., xx (I),
no. 1106 [544] (4 July 1545) the English suggested sending 3–4,000 men to aid the
Islesmen who were to occupy Huntly and Argyll. Otherwise, a large army would be
needed in the Borders ‘for all Scotland will be there by reason of encouragements of
the Frenchmen and the French king’s promises’.
106 Kerne was the name given to Irish forces, while galloglass refers to Scots permanently
settled in Ireland under the pay of Irish and English-Irish lords.
107 L&P Henry VIII, xx (II), no. 295; Nicholas Maclean-Bristol, Warriors and Priests: The
History of the Clan MacLean, 1300–1570 (East Linton, 1995), 119.
108 For details of the negotiations between Donald Dubh and Henry, see L&P Henry
VIII, xx (I), no. 1298; xx (II), nos. 40–2, 120–1, 198, 291–5, 304–5. Lennox needed
munitions because those sent by the French king had been stored in Dumbarton
Castle. Having failed to recapture the castle Lennox no longer had access to its
resources.
109 L&P Henry VIII, xx (II), no. 562.
110 L&P Henry VIII, xx (II), no. 562. This suggests that perhaps it was the Old English
who provided support for Donald’s rebellion. L&P Henry VIII, xix (I), no. 261
indicates that in March 1544 Henry had ordered 1,000 kerne to be sent to England
to fight against the Scots.
111 ‘Book of the Clanranald’, ii, 167.
112 L&P Henry VIII, xix (II), no. 770; xx (I), nos. 129, 295, 562. It would appear that
Lennox departed for the Borders at the end of December but he was certainly in
Carlisle by February 1544/5.
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galloglass, 1,550 Irish kerne (fifty with half hakes) and fifty archers, he
sailed to Scotland.113
It is unlikely that the invasion force headed for Dumbarton.114 On
5 October 1545 Argyll had been granted Glenfruin, Rosneath and the
Isle of Inchmurrin in Loch Lomond.115 These lands, lying within the
earldom of Lennox, were in crown hands following the recent forfeiture
of Lennox. Granting the Rosneath peninsula to Argyll, for the earl’s
service in defence of the kingdom against the English enemy, was a
strategic move. Lennox no longer had clear access through the Firth
of Clyde to Dumbarton Castle, which, by this time, was in the hands
of the pro-French administration. It is possible the fleet headed for
Ayr or Bute instead.116 It is, however, not clear what happened when
Lennox, Ormond and the Irish force arrived in Scotland but efforts
to reunite the Islesmen were unsuccessful.117 Donald Dubh failed in
amassing another army to continue with the plan. Subsequently, he
returned to Ireland and died at Drogheda ‘of a fever of five nights’.118
James MacDonald of Dunivaig grasped the opportunity and, writing
from Ardnamurchan on 24 January 1546, he asked Henry for two
or three ships and money. MacAllister and Maclean, Donald Dubh’s
commissioners who were still in Dublin, presented his letters to the lord
deputy and council in February but the offer received no response.119
The moment for rebellion had passed.
Lennox’s recall to the Borders is often advanced as the explanation
for why the rebellion of 1545 petered out.120 Lennox had been in
Carlisle since December 1544 although in the weeks preceding the
rebellion he appears to have been frequently on the move. In late
August 1545 MacLean andMacAllister, in London, requested a meeting
113 L&P Henry VIII, xx (II), nos. 562, 662, 676, 796; CSPI, i, 73 (nos. 23, 25).
114 Holinshed’s Chronicles of England, Scotland and Ireland, 6 vols (London, 1807–8), vi,
315–16 suggests that storms blew the fleet, anchored at Olderfleet, a castle on the
coast not far from Carrickfergus, to Dumbarton and then ‘gratious clemencie’ blew
the fleet safely back to Ireland.
115 RMS, iii, no. 3173.
116 L&P Henry VIII, xx (II), no. 676.
117 L&P Henry VIII, xx (II), no. 819. The Irish council had not been optimistic that
Lennox would be able to reunite the force.
118 ‘The Book of Clanranald’, 167, states he left no child; but Gregory,Western Highlands,
176 and MacDonald, Clan Donald, i, 386 suggest that he left an illegitimate son in
the care of Henry. On 25 April 1551 Archibald, earl of Argyll, received a charter from
Arran, then governor, regarding Rory MacLeod of Lewis who ‘hies laitlie takin ane
pupill barne . . . and haldes him in nurssing & maintenna[n]ce of purpose & mynd
to make & set him forwart at the utremost of his power tobe lord of ye Ilis & using
yat na[me] and draw samony as he may . . . gif ye shoud be sufferit, it wilbe occasioun
of gret truble & inconveinets to ws and [com]mon wele of orwe realme’. There is
no further evidence that this ‘barne’ was a child of Donald Dubh (Inveraray Castle
Archives, bundle 1083).
119 CSPI, i, 73 (no. 29); 74 (no. 31). In May of that year MacAllastair and MacLean, still
in Dublin, were trying to return to Scotland while according to John Roche Dascent
(ed.), Acts of the Privy Council of England: New Series, 46 vols (London, 1860–1964), i,
483, MacLean died in Dublin soon after this.
120 Murdoch, Terror of the Seas?, 55.
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with the earl and for him to be sent to Ireland.121 Lennox still had
an important intermediary role between the Islesmen and Henry. But
while significant, his absence was not the only reason for the failure to
amalgamate the force of Irish and Scots. Donald Dubh too was unable
to maintain unity among the Islesmen. The kerne and gallowglass who
were to join the Islesmen were to be chosen ‘out of the “most wild
and savage sort’’ . . . whose absence should do good rather than hurt’.122
Assembling this army at short notice proved difficult and, as St Leger
informed the English privy council, the ‘journey into Scotland is strange
to the men of this land’; it was compounded by ‘the bruit of slaying of
their countrymen in the late conflict on the Borders of Scotland’.123
Irish troops had been sent to the Borders previously, in 1544, and
although Hertford initially regarded them as ‘unrewly and farr out of
good order’ he subsequently commended their ‘good service in this
journey’.124 He noted also that the Irish had ‘moche dred of the Scottes’
and disliked their custom of killing enemies rather than taking them
prisoner.125 This reluctance of the Irish to fight alongside Donald Dubh,
in alliance with Henry against the Scots and Argyll, is intriguing. Several
Scottish clans, notably the MacDonalds, MacLeans and Campbells,
maintained Irish ties. Perhaps Argyll (and/or James MacDonald of
Dunivaig), exercised greater leverage over the galloglass than Donald
Dubh.126 It is also possible that Irish reluctance was ideological (since
many Irish continued to oppose Tudor authority in Ireland) or that it
was simply an expression of reluctance to leave home. Payment of wages
may have enticed many to serve in the Borders but reports filtering back
of inadequate food supplies would have been a very real disincentive to
further engagement. Irish lords, of course, also needed to maintain a
fighting force on their own lands.
Absence from home was not something that the Islesmen too would
long tolerate. Given the war with England and widespread unrest in
the west Highlands and Isles, delays at Carrickfergus were not ideal.
For the Islesmen wages were also a thorny issue. The western Isles
maintained a body of fighting men who were not ‘labourers of ye
ground’.127 These men were permitted to ‘byde firth ane haill zeir
as ofttimes it happins . . . ony . . . p[ar]ticular Islands has to do w[i]t[h]
121 L&P Henry VIII, xx (II), no. 196.
122 L&P Henry VIII, xx (II), 305. Their ‘absence’ refers to their absence from Ireland.
123 L&P Henry VIII, xx (II), 562.
124 Hamilton Papers, ii, nos. 212, 219, 231, 244, 261; Appendix no. 22.
125 Hamilton Papers, ii, nos. 261, 327. This was also the custom of the Borders.
The Scots did not receive wages, so would not spare victuals for prisoners. By
September 1544 the English reported the Irish were raiding Scottish towns for
corn.
126 The English were aware of connections between the O’Donnells of Tyrconnell and
Argyll; see CSPI, i, 65 (no. 2); 67 (no. 18). Despite the growing resentment towards
Campbell expansion the earl of Argyll continued to be a very powerful and influential
figure in the politics of the west Highlands and Isles.
127 NLS, Adv. MS. 31.2.6., which states that the total number of men maintained for
warfare was 6,000; W.F. Skene, Celtic Scotland: A History of Ancient Alban (Edinburgh,
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Irland or neighbo[u]rs’.128 Thus, Highlanders and Islesmen had a long
record of fighting in the wars of the native Irish but they did not
do so without pay. Although Henry had promised wages for 3,000
men for two months, the Islesmen had already spent one month
at Carrickfergus before returning home. It is difficult to corroborate
the claim that they disbanded because of internal squabbles over the
distribution of the English money but it is clear that money was a
factor. During the negotiations between Henry and Donald Dubh the
issue of financial payment loomed large.129 Aggrieved by recent rent
increases, the Islesmen were not in a position to maintain themselves
for a sustained absence from home. The Islesmen were not, however,
motivated purely by mercenary ends.
Restoration of the lordship was an aspiration of many from the
forfeiture of 1493 until the mid-seventeenth century.130 This was
more than just nostalgia for a supposed golden age. It was a very
real expression of the grievances of the Islesmen. The only extant
contemporary source from the region, was written by Donald Monro,
a priest at Snizort, in Skye, in 1526 and then rector of Briagh na
h-Aoidhe, near Stornoway, in the late 1540s. Monro’s account was the
first to refer to the council of the Isles which is assumed to have met at
Finlaggan. The fourteen members of the council supposedly ‘decernit,
decreitit and gave suits furth upon all debaitable matters according to
the Laws’, even if the ‘Lord were at his hunting or at ony uther games’.131
Considering the correlation between the signatories of the ‘Ellencarne’
commission of 28 July 1545 and the council described by Monro, it
has been suggested that Monro revealed less about how the lordship
operated during the fifteenth century and more about the realities of
the mid-sixteenth century; Monro’s council comprised ‘the leaders of
Hebridean kindreds, mindful and jealous of their own status, rights
and privileges’.132 He described how these Islesmen had governed the
region since the forfeiture: ‘thair was great peace and welth in the Iles
throw the ministration of justice’.133
127 (Continued) 1880), iii, 428–40. For more details of this see D.H. Caldwell, ‘The sea-
power of the western isles of Scotland in the late medieval period’ (forthcoming). My
thanks to Dr Caldwell for allowing me to see a copy of this article prior to publication.
128 NLS, Adv. MS. 31.2.6., fo. 31r.
129 L&P Henry VIII, xx (I), no. 865. It was not just the Islesmen who Henry sought to win
over through the promise of money. See also L&P Henry VIII, xix (I), nos. 337, 522,
779.
130 Aonghas MacCoinnich, “His spirit was given only to warre’: conflict and identity in
the Scottish Gáidhealtachd, c.1580–c.1630’ in Steve Murdoch and Andrew Mackillop
(eds), Fighting for Identity: Scottish Military Experience, c.1550–1900 (Leiden, 2002), 148.
131 A Description of the Occidental i.e. Western Islands of Scotland by Mr Donald Monro who
travelled through many of them in Anno 1549 (Edinburgh, 1999), 310.
132 Stephen Boardman, ‘The lordship of the Isles’, in Seán Duffy and Susan Foran
(eds), The English Isles: Cultural Transmission and Political Conflict in Britain and Ireland,
1100–1500 (Dublin, forthcoming). My thanks to Dr Boardman for allowing me to see
a copy of this article prior to publication.
133 Description of the Occidental Isles, 310.
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This peace, wealth and justice had been maintained despite more
intensive crown intervention after 1493. James IV had enacted
legislation to ensure the observance of Scots law in the Isles; successive
earls of Argyll and Huntly had been used to enforce government
policy; and there had been consistent efforts to maximise crown
revenues in the region.134 All of this came without representation.
The ‘Ellencarne’ signatories were, therefore, a disaffected ‘political
community’, supporting Donald Dubh’s rising because it offered an
opportunity to express grievance at a time when such actions were not,
as they asserted, a rebellion against the Scottish crown.135
That the rebellion of the Islesmen was aimed at the minority
government and the earl of Argyll in particular was oft reiterated, as was
the assertion that the Islesmen remained loyal subjects of the Scottish
crown. O’Neill claimed that Argyll was Donald Dubh’s ‘mortal enemy’
and Donald’s own letters emphasised that the Islesmen had consistently
opposed ‘enemies to the realm of Scotland’.136 In their final agreement
with Henry the Islesmen were engaged specifically against Huntly and
Argyll. This is understandable from an English perspective, as keeping
Argyll and Huntly occupied on their estates in the south-west and north-
east respectively would be advantageous for the English army on the
Borders.137 It is less clear why Argyll was singled out by Donald Dubh.
The Campbells of Argyll were not the hated figures they would become
a century later.
Criticism of Argyll echoed John Elder’s letter to Henry VIII of
1542/3. Elder’s aim was, however, to distinguish Argyll from other
‘valiaunt Yrishe lordes of Scotland’.138 Subsequently, Argyll’s role in
government, his refusal to join with the pro-English party, his kinship
ties to Arran and his decision not to join Gaels in the west combined
to ensure that he became the main focus for resentment on the part
of those in rebellion. Still, the western Highlands and Isles were not
homogenous and Argyll was not alone in his refusal to rebel. While the
chiefs of most lordship clans supported the rising, James MacDonald of
Dunivaig and the Glens was non-committal, even although he assumed
leadership of the movement, without any great success, following
Donald Dubh’s death.139 While Donald had his own agenda, it is likely
that other Highland chiefs carried personal ambitions too. Lordship
restoration provided only a fragile unity and individual concerns with
134 RPS, 1504/3/45 (accessed 30 June 2012).
135 Boardman, ‘Lordship of the Isles’.
136 L&P Henry VIII, xx (I), no. 273; xx (II), no. 294 [135].
137 L&P Henry VIII, xx (II), no. 1106 [544].
138 ‘A Proposal for uniting Scotland with England, addressed to King Henry VIII by John
Elder, Clerke, a Redshank, 1542 or 1543’.
139 L&P Henry VIII, xxi (I), nos. 114, 138, 219, 275; CSPI, i, 73–4 (no. 29) suggests that
James was recognised by some as heir to the lordship.
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land and local, rather than national, issues, was evident amongst the
lords of the south-west too.140
Several lords of the south-west had allied with Henry because they
genuinely supported closer union with England through the marriage
of Mary and Edward. Some, like Huntly, opposed Henry because
they were committed to the catholic cause and did not want to see
protestantism encouraged in Scotland. Religious views did not always
shape political allegiances. Although Argyll was catholic, his loyalty
to the Arran administration derived from close kinship ties with the
regent, a desire to protect Campbell estates and a concern to defend
wider Scottish interests in the face of English aggression. Lennox, also
catholic (despite his promises of conversion to protestantism in 1544),
allied with Henry because of self-interest.141 His personal ambitions
in Scotland were thwarted by Arran’s appointment as governor and,
alienated from the French king, Lennox trod the well-worn path to
London taken by many disgruntled Scots. Self-interest remained a
powerful force.
It has been argued that ‘the Scottish nobles . . . in the long
run . . . were true to Scottish interests. The spirit of nationality was
more powerful than the disintegrating forces of selfishness.’142 But this
view is hard to sustain in the face of such factionalism and vacillation
on the part of those involved. For example, Archibald Douglas, sixth
earl of Angus, who had been driven into exile by James V in 1529,
signed a contract in 1532 recognising Henry VIII as supreme lord of
Scotland. A long-term ally of the English king, he supported dynastic
union through marriage but changed to support the Scottish side late
in 1544 and continued this attachment until his death. No doubt his
switch was encouraged by the remissions which Mary of Guise granted
to several earls, including Cassillis and Glencairn, as well as Angus, in
November 1544. Ultimately, however, Angus’s move was motivated by
his desire to protect his interests in the south-west: alliance with the
winning side was the surest way to achieve this.143 Glencairn supported
Henry’s campaign because he favoured religious reform but he changed
sides constantly, eventually dying a pensioner of France in March
1548.144 While a developing sense of national identity can be detected
140 Despite Henry’s attempt to persuade them to ‘work so substancially, as your affections
and good willes to the avauncement of our affayres’. See Hamilton Papers, ii, no. 69
[114].
141 Given Lennox’s catholicism and Henry’s reluctant protestantism, Elder’s connection
with both makes his anti-Catholic epistle appear somewhat disingenuous. See
Murdoch, Terror of the Seas?, 51, where Lennox is described as ‘newly protestant’.
142 Scottish Correspondence, p. xxv.
143 Merriman,RoughWooings, 142–3; Gregory,Western Highlands, 165; Marcus Merriman,
‘Douglas, Archibald, sixth earl of Angus (c.1489–1557)’,Oxford DNB (accessed 30 June
2012). Merriman uses the example of the Douglas earls of Angus to illustrate this.
144 Scottish Correspondence, p. xxv, n. 1; nos. 26, 29, 35, 76–7, 84; L&P Henry VIII, xix
(I), nos. 243, 522, 779; xix (II), nos. 185, 302; xx (I), no. 1106; M.H.B. Sanderson,
‘Cunningham, William, third earl of Glencairn (d. 1548)’, Oxford DNB (accessed 30
June 2012).
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throughout this period, identity remained multi-faceted, conditioned
by political, religious, regional, dynastic and personal factors, as well as
by nationalism.145
Henry’s efforts to conquer Scotland had the potential to redraw the
political map of Britain and Ireland. Rather than indulge in counter-
factual speculations, we can, however, best understand his failure by
analysing the origin of his quest. The Henrician Reformation had
resulted in a complete realignment of English foreign policy. While
Henry had been troubled by unrest in Ireland before the 1530s, he
could no longer afford to let it rumble on. Foreign, catholic intervention
in Ireland posed a direct threat to England’s security. On his northern
border Henry had tolerated his nephew, James V, interfering in his
new Irish kingdom and growing in stature on the European stage,
even although other European powers sought to use James in order to
irritate the English king.146 After James’s death, Arran’s flirtation with
protestantism was promising but short-lived. The denunciation of the
treaties of Greenwich and Arran’s reconciliation with Beaton meant a
catholic Scotland continued to pose a threat to the English king. The
invasion that followed was not simply an attempt to persuade the Scots
forcibly into agreeing to the dynastic union. It was also, in accordance
with tradition, intended to secure England’s northern border.147
It was set against this wider imperative that Henry recognized
the importance of the west, and the Firth of Clyde and Dumbarton
Castle in particular. He received regular reports of French shipping
sailing through the Irish Sea and Clyde estuary and realized the
potential for attacking Scotland from the west.148 Through negotiation
and circumstance Henry gathered allies in the west, who possessed
knowledge of tides and navigation and who could provide substantial
military and maritime support on both sides of the Clyde. The extent
of his support in the west of Scotland explained Henry’s belief that
the west, Stirling and Leith were the keys to Scotland. But his western
allies comprised various groups, motivated by different factors. Henry
managed to bring this disparate force together in 1545 but he was an
opportunist who at times needed encouragement to act. He did not
have a well-formulated or carefully-planned archipelagic agenda and he
had no coherent naval and military outlook. Although Henry arguably
laid the foundations of English naval strength, his efforts were not the
result of an ‘instinctive appreciation of the importance of sea power’ or,
indeed, of any grand plan for English supremacy of the seas. They were
born of necessity.149 Indeed, it is doubtful if Henry fully thought through
145 M.H.B. Sanderson, Ayrshire and the Reformation: People and Change, 1490–1600 (East
Linton, 1997), 59–60.
146 Cathcart, ‘James V, king of Scotland’, 132–7.
147 Hiram Morgan, ‘British policies before the British state’, in Brendan Bradshaw and
John Morrill (eds), The British Problem, c.1534–1707: State Formation in the Atlantic
Archipelago (Basingstoke, 1996), 73; J.J. Scarisbrick, Henry VIII (London, 1968), 424.
148 For example, see L&P Henry VIII, xx (I), no. 665.
149 Rodgers, Safeguard of the Seas, 165.
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the implications of co-ordinating his forces in the three kingdoms and
he did not try to exploit the full maritime power of the western Isles.
He allowed the opportunity of 1545 to slip through his fingers because
he thought in terms of a land war, using naval forces simply to transport
men and supplies, and because there were weightier distractions on the
continent. Unable to give Scotland his full attention, Henry was slow
to harness support, causing some to waver in their loyalty and others
to change sides. His lack of strategic planning explains why his force
disintegrated at a crucial moment. He failed to see that such a force
would readily default to local and regional concerns regarding land and
self-preservation if momentum was not maintained. Indeed, had Henry
devoted more time and planning to 1545, contrary to Donaldson’s
opinion, it might well have been in the West Highlands that the fates of
Scotland, England and Ireland were decided.150
150 Donaldson (Scotland, 72) argued that ‘the fate of Scotland was not to be determined
in the West Highlands’.
